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THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. By Susan M. Phillips and 
J. Richard Zecher. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1981. Pp. ix, 
120. $22.50. 
Although the federal government has heavily regulated the se-
curities industry for nearly fifty years, commentators are still unable 
to agree whether its regulatory program has actually aided investors. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) successful der-
egulation of the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) fixed commis-
sion rates stands in marked contrast to its failure to provide any clear 
goals for the development of a national securities market. 1 And the 
SEC's corporate disclosure system continues to expand despite stud-
ies indicating that the costly disclosure requirements produce little or 
no benefits. In The SEC and the Public Interest, Susan Phillips and 
J. Richard Zecher use economic theories of regulation to explain 
why the SEC's efforts have produced these mixed results. They con-
clude that the SEC is best viewed as a broker balancing out the 
strongly competing groups in the securities industry. The book's ex-
tensive reliance on economic theory and empirical data will deter 
many readers, but those interested in regulatory theory or the intri-
cacies of the regulatory process will gain some insight into the forces 
influencing the SEC and other regulatory agencies. 
After reviewing the historical development of the SEC and the 
premises on which it was founded, Phillips and Zecher describe two 
economic theories of regulation that underlie most of their analysis. 
The "market failure" theory suggests that failures within or devia-
5. Corporations and Information is also reviewed by Howell, Book Review, 67 A.B.A.J. 618 
(1981); Wilson, Book Review, 105 LIB. J. 1626 (1980). 
I. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78b (1976)). 
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tions from a purely competitive marketplace justify regulatory pro-
grams that approximate free market solutions (p. 24). Regulatory 
agencies, market failure theorists argue, should define the market 
conditions that will serve the public interest, establish regulatory cri-
teria, and conduct ongoing cost-benefit assessments of their pro-
grams. Many of these programs, however, have not worked as 
intended, and economists have turned to a second regulatory theory 
- "public choice" - to explain why well-intentioned and well-
designed regulatory efforts might fail. 
The public choice theory posits that every regulatory action real-
locates resources: some sectors of the economy gain while others 
bear a "regulatory tax." The regulatory agency, this theory holds, 
seeks to maximize support for (or, alternatively, to minimize opposi-
tion to) its programs. Because the cost of effectively organizing a 
diffuse interest group is often high relative to the amount of the regu-
latory tax, small groups with well-defined economic interests at stake 
often succeed in imposing such taxes on larger groups. Regulatory 
managers, therefore, have little incentive to discuss specifict measur-
able goals or to subject their actions to cost-benefit analysis (pp. 24-
25). The public choice theory also predicts that agencies will impede 
the formation of opposition groups by obfuscating the regulatory 
process. 
These two theories, Phillips and Zecher believe, can provide a 
framework for analyzing federal regulation of the securities market. 
They consider in depth the corporate disclosure system, the deregu-
lation of fixed commission rates, and the development of a national 
market system for securities. Their analysis indicates that the 
facially competing theories actually complement each other: Market 
failure explains why regulations are enacted, and public choice ex-
plains why they fail to achieve their stated goals. Ultimately, the 
authors conclude that the SEC's involvement in each of these three 
areas is best explained by the public choice theory. 
The first regulatory program examined - corporate disclosure -
was based on the market failure theory. Congress enacted the Secur-
ities Act of 19332 in response to a perceived market failure in the 
stock market crash of 1929. It believed that disclosure would allow 
investors to make informed decisions and protect them from price 
manipulators and corporate mismanagement. Phillips and Zecher, 
however, question whether the abuses were as widespread or harm-
ful as Congress and the public believed (pp. 28, 36). Using efficient 
pricing of securities as the measure of the "public interest," for ex-
ample, the authors argue that insider trading moves prices to a new 
equilibrium level that could offset price manipulation (p. 36). The 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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unfairness to investors without inside information is basically 
ignored. 
The authors then attempt to document and explain the failure of 
disclosure requirements. Their review of pricing efficiency reveals 
that disclosure has not significantly improved the pricing of securi-
ties. They also estimate that corporations spend about a billion dol-
lars annually to comply with the disclosure requirements. Because 
they conclude that disclosure fails any rational cost-benefit test, they 
tum to the public choice theory to explain why the requirements en-
counter little organized resistance. Their explanation is straightfor-
ward: Securities lawyers and accountants who prepare disclosure 
documents and analysts who receive them free are relatively small, 
well-organized groups that benefit from the current system. But the 
corporations and investors that pay for the system are either ignorant 
of the burden or unbothered by it. 
Phillips and Zecher again rely on the public choice theory to ana-
lyze the SEC's role in the successful deregulation of the NYSE's 
fixed commission rates. They use the Stigler-Peltzman model of 
public regulation3 to develop hypotheses regarding wealth transfers 
between competing groups and the relative responsiveness of the 
SEC in allowing rate changes caused by increases in production 
costs or shifts in demand. The hypotheses are tested using empirical 
data on brokerage costs for transactions of various sizes and the 
shifts in market composition caused by the increased importance of 
institutional investors. Since many of the hypotheses tested have lit-
tle practical relevance to the SEC, it is unclear whether the authors 
seek primarily to explain the SEC's actions or to test the validity of 
the underlying economic theory of regulation. 
Fixed commission rates, Phillips and Zecher claim, benefited 
small groups of brokers and exacted a small regulatory tax from all 
investors. As institutional investors, who were paying an increas-
ingly large regulatory tax, grew in importance, and as the Justice 
Department and Congress pressured the SEC to deregulate commis-
sion rates, the SEC slowly abandoned its support for the NYSE bro-
kers, first by allowing some lower commission rates for large 
transactions and eventually by full deregulation. The success of the 
deregulatory effort despite strong opposition by the NYSE under-
mines the popular notion that regulatory agencies are captives of the 
industries they regulate. Rather, under the public choice theory, the 
regulator as broker will permit ,shifts in programs when competing 
groups can effectively oppose the current beneficiaries of regulation. 
Although the authors offer a public choice explanation for the 
SEC's success in deregulation, the market failure theory could also 
3. See Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211, 213-
22 (1976). 
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explain the Commission's actions. Fixed commission rates existed 
long before the establishment of the SEC. Congress, by not ordering 
the system dismantled, appeared to approve its continuance, al-
lowing the SEC to regulate it. But the increased importance of insti-
tutional investors may have caused a market failure because reduced 
costs were not reflected in commission rates. Congress may have 
perceived this failure and directed the SEC to correct it. The Com-
mission succeeded in this goal, despite bitter opposition by the 
NYSE. 
In addition to pressuring the SEC to deregulate commissions, 
Congress directed it to facilitate the development of a national mar-
ket system. The SEC, however, has not taken any firm steps toward 
that goal. Phillips and Zecher examine evidence tending to show 
that the NYSE is the lowest-cost producer in the security exchange 
industry and thus may be a natural monopoly.4 The authors believe 
that the SEC's lack of success in the market structure area results 
from its attempts to promote competition among the regional ex-
changes. By issuing regulations designed to help the regional stock 
exchanges compete with the NYSE, the SEC is impeding a natural 
process that would otherwise evolve into a national market system. 
In sum, the view presented is that the "public interest" would be 
served by allowing the NYSE to become a monopoly by free market 
forces, thus passively "fulfilling" Congress's mandate for a national 
market system. 
The SEC and the Public Interest is part of the increasingly vocal 
attack on regulatory agencies by economists who define "public in-
terest" as free market solutions and who have decided that the free 
market is preferable to regulation. 
Although Phillips and Zecher's research is not definitive, their 
work should challenge economists and policy-makers to reexamine 
the purposes and effects of the Commission's regulations. Readers 
should be warned, however, that few of the authors' conclusions are 
novel, and that their style of presentation makes the book relatively 
inaccessible to those untrained in microeconomic theory. 
4. The discussion of whether the NYSE is a natural monopoly relies heavily on Robert W. 
Doede, The Monopoly Power of the New York Stock Exchange (1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Economics, University of Chicago). The authors update Doede's findings us-
ing statistics on exchange seat prices for the period following deregulation. 
